Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its Withdrawal by Ehrenzweig, Albert A.
[Vol.113
THE SECOND CONFLICTS RESTATEMENT: A
LAST APPEAL FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL
ALBET A. EHRENZWETG t
In 1934 the "Restatement" of the Law of Conflict of Laws was
offered to the profession as "a statement of the existing state of the
common law." 1 That it never was such a statement has always been
widely recognized' and has now been admitted by the American Law
Institute.3 But it took a whole generation of scholars to destroy that
unfortunate product of misguided idealism 4 and obsolete doctrine,5 out
of whose "wreckage," in the words of Chief Justice Traynor, today's
judge still "must chop his own way through." 6 And it will be some
time yet until the rubble-judicial language based on false doctrine-
will have been cleared away.
One might have hoped that this distressing result of an ill-conceived
experiment would have precluded renewal of the effort to produce a
Restatement. It was with serious misgivings, therefore, that some of
us learned more than a decade ago of the start of a similar venture.
And it was some of these misgivings that I expressed in this Review
when I urged abandonment of that ventureT Yet ever since, Draft
has followed Draft, and we must now expect submission of an entire
Second Restatement for final adoption.
tWalter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
12 ALI PRoCEEDINGs 21 (1924). See also Goodrich, The Story of the American
Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 283, 290.
2See note 40 infra.
3 See note 26 infra.
4 See, e.g., ENZvZWEIG, TREATISE ON T E CoNFLiCr OF LAws § 4 n.18 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as TREATISE].
5 See id. §§ 2-4, 107.
0 Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F.
230, 234.
7 Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in Its Historical Perspective: Should
the Restatement Be "Continued"?, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954). See also
Ehrenzweig, El "Restatement" de "Conflict of Laws", 5 BOLErIN DEL INSTITUTO DE
Dz=acHo CoramAo DE Mtxlco 258 (1952) ; Ehrenzweig, El "Restatement" ameri-
cano del conflicto de derechos: Historia de un fracaso, 3 CuADERNos DERScHoS AxGLo-
AmEuICANO 37 (1955); Ehrenzweig, Su un profilo storico dei conflitti di leggi in
America, 9 Jus, RhvIsTA DE SciENzE GluRmicHE 519 (1958) ; Ehrenzweig, American
Private International Law and the "Restatement", 28 NoaRISK TmssxR--T FOR INT'-
RET 229 (1958) ; Ehrenzweig, Zun Handwerkszeug des amerikanischen internationalen
Privatrechts, 7 OSTERREICHISCE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 6FrFNTrICHES RECHT 521 (1956).
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During this period, in several books and numerous articles,8 I
have analyzed in detail the project as it progressed and have been
confirmed in my doubts by such scholars as Arthur Corbin who has
strongly disapproved the Second Restatement's entire approach,9 and
Brainerd Currie who has stated that "at this stage we certainly do not
need a new Restatement, although we are threatened with one." 1o
Indeed, there is the danger that another Cook and another Lorenzen
will have to spend their life's work to undo this new Restatement-a
sacrifice American scholarship can ill afford. For that document, de-
spite the valiant efforts of an able draftsman, may well parallel its
predecessor as a hindrance to the sound development of the common
law. And again this hindrance could prove particularly serious
abroad':' and in those American jurisdictions which, lacking precedent,
would again be tempted to treat the Institute's announcements as
primary authority.' It was for these reasons that I recently submitted
to the Council a "Last Appeal" for the appointment of a special
commission consisting of particularly qualified judges, lawyers and
scholars,'" which would be asked to reexamine the Draft to determine
whether any second restatement is desirable at this time, and, if it is,
how the present draft could be improved in collaboration with the
Reporter and his advisers. With a view to such possible improvements
I suggested the following questions for consideration: (1) whether
the Draft should not be expressly limited to interstate conflicts; (2)
whether it should not be revised with a view to achieving greater
theoretical consistency; (3) whether it should not be revised to respond
to current doctrine; and, (4) whether in any event it should not be
8 TREATISE, passim; EHRENZWEIG & LouIsE.L, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL
(1964); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL (1965); EHRENZWEIG, FRAGISTAS
& YANNOPOULOUS, AmERICAN-GREEK PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw (1957); EmMN-
ZWEIG, IKEHARAT & JENSEN, AmERICAN-JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1964). The following articles published with the subtitle "Law and Reason Versus
the Restatement Second" are also pertinent in part: Ehrenzweig, Miscegenation in the
Conflict of Laws, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 659 (1960) ; Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant
Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 700 (1963) ;
Ehrenzweig, Restitution in the Conflict of Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1298 (1961).
For a bibliography, see Symposiun-Ehrenzweig's Proper Forum and Proper Law,
to be published in Volume 18 of the Oklahoma Law Review.
9 See EHRENzWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL § 8 (1965), containing extensive
extracts from Corbin's letters, published with his authorization.
10 Currie, The Disinterested Forum, 28 LAw & CoNTEZM. PROB. 754, 755 (1963).
See also Cavers, Re-stating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts, in XXTH
CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 349, 364 (1961).
11 See text at notes 15-22, infra.
12 See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Restatement as a Source of Conflicts Law in Ari-
aona, 2 ARiz. L. REV. 177 (1960). Concerning the Restatement's general claim to
such authority, see Goodrich, supra note 1, at 290.
13 Among many others Black, Breitel, Brown, Friendly, Fuld, Harlan, Hastie,
Heffernan, Kaufman, Kenison, O'Connell, Roberts, Schaefer, Sobeloff, Tate, Traynor,
and Wyzanski, JJ., and Professors Cavers, Currie, Hancock, Leflar, Rheinstein, Von
Mehren, and Yntema would no doubt have been on the list of those invited.
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limited to those narrow propositions which are settled by judicial prac-
tice (rather than mere language), and accompanied by an express
"repeal" of the First Restatement.4
The Council did not find any of these suggestions acceptable. And
at its May meeting the Institute approached final adoption of its nearly
completed project. My purpose then in this present publication is to
establish, for those courts and lawyers who in the future will be asked
to "apply" the provisions of the new "restatement," that this document,
like its predecessor, does not reflect the "communis opinio" of either
courts or scholars. The fact that the Drafts may be credited for many
improvements over the First Restatement might have made them
preferable to the latter at the time of its publication, but it does not
justify the adoption of a Second Restatement at this time. Not only is
this new experiment beset by theoretical difficulties similar to those
which have discredited its predecessor, but many new specific provisions
will inevitably add to the confusion created by the original version.
My "last appeal" has to be brief and must therefore rely on earlier
writings for documentation.
I. SHOULD THE DRAFT NOT BE EXPRESSLY LIMITED TO INTERSTATE
CONFLICTS?
Perhaps due to a widespread misconception of the Institute as an
official agency, and the great attraction of any black-letter text for
code-trained lawyers, 5 the Restatement has been translated into foreign
languages "6 and has received full recognition abroad as the principal
source of American law." Thus all over the world comparative law in-
stitutes acting as official court experts have treated the Restatement as
conclusive evidence of American international conflicts law. This is
hardly compatible with the Institute's own belief that "the rules of law
in the Restatement of the subject are perhaps better fitted to interstate
than to inter-foreign transactions." ' Indeed, in many respects consti-
tutional and other considerations require a separate treatment of inter-
14There would have been precedent for the proposed procedure. The First
Restatement, because of a "violent controversy . . . was held for two years' addi-
tional time and reexamined by the Institute's Executive Committee." Goodrich, supra
note 1, at 288.
15 This reaction is particularly regrettable in the communist countries in view of
the still prevailing difficulty in communication. See, e.g., TREATISE § 123, at 351 n.3, for
the Russian conception of the conflicts restatement as an "inofficial code." For an
historical curiosity see also such decisions of American Occupation courts as Turner
v. Dinges, 7 U.S. Courts of the Allied High Comm'n for Germany 90, 91 (1949).
36 See, e.g., ALI ANN. REa. 24-27; 1942 ALI ANN. REP. 16; 1948 ALI ANN.
REP. 8; RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 22 (1945).
17 "The [Conflicts] Restatement abroad as a definitive source of American law
is . . . noteworthy"; "standard reference in civil law countries." Goodrich, in
1948 ALI ANN. RE'. 7.18 RESTATEMENT IN THE CoURTs 11 (1945). See also 1 ALl PROCEEDINGS 66-67
(1923) ; 4 ALI PROCEEDINGS 254-69 (1926).
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national conflicts,' 9 and such a treatment may even vary according to
the foreign country involved, as is dramatically illustrated by the
success of the Parker Institute's series of bilateral studies.20  It is par-
ticularly significant in this context that the Reporter of the Second
Restatement at one point expressed his personal view that the Draft,
except where its text clearly indicates otherwise, should be read as
referring only to interstate conflicts.2 To be sure, examination may
very well show that in some areas American courts apply the same
general principles in both international and interstate cases. But until
such an examination has been made-and it has never yet been
attempted-an express exclusion of international conflicts seems in
order to avoid further misunderstandings both abroad and at home.
Indeed, a statement to that effect seems imperative at this time when
the United States Government has decided to participate in the work
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law and when
efforts are being continued for an interamerican harmonization of
conflicts law. We must make certain that these international ventures
cease to treat the Restatement as a correct summary of this country's
international conflicts law.22
19 See Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segre-
gation, 41 MINN. L. REv. 717 (1957); and virtually all foreign reviews of my
TREATISE, listed in Symposium, supra note 8. Against the proposed separate treat-
ment it is tempting to argue that two important recent decisions which involved
international conflicts, have become leading in interstate cases. But Auten v. Auten,
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), though now generally relied on for a general
theory of the "most significant relationship," probably did not involve conflicting
laws and, if it did, was determined by the forum's distaste for forfeitures, see TREATIS E
§ 183, at 487; and Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d
279 (1963) concerned the "guest statute" of an adjoining Canadian province and thus
presented a conflict entirely analogous to those existing between sister states. See
Comment, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1212 (1963).
20 This series has grown to include thirteen countries: Australia (Cowen, 1957),
Austria (Seidl-Hohenveldern, 1963), Brazil (Garland, 1959), Chile (Etcheberry,
1960), Colombia (Eder, 1956), Denmark (Philip, 1957), France (Delaume, 1953,
1961), Germany (Domke, 1956), Greece (Ehrenzweig, Fragistas and Yiannopoulos,
1957), Japan (Ehrenzweig, Ikehara and Jensen, 1964), Sweden (Nial, 1965), and
Switzerland (Nussbaum, 1951, 1958).
21 See the authorized quotation in Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International Con-
flicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. Rrv. 717 (1957). But cf. RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND), CONFLICr OF LAws § 5a (Tent Draft No. 12, 1965), which declares
the Restatement rules applicable to "international Conflict of Laws cases unless the
factors in the particular case call for a result different from that which would be
reached in an interstate case." "Some differences in factors" are enumerated in
comment d on a purely academic level without citation of authority.
22 See, e.g., Comparative Study of the Bustamente Code, the Montevideo Treaties,
and the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, O.A.S. INrTa-AM zicAN JUmDCAL
CommTTrrE (CIJ-21) (1954). Most important, we must not bar the way to a national
law that the Supreme Court may yet sanction "in ordering our relationships with
other members of the international community. . . ." Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). See also the dictum in United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) : "in respect of our foreign relations generally . . .
state lines disappear."
Such a development towards a "national law" is increasingly likely in view of the
fast-growing demand for a "transnational law" in world commerce. See, e.g., Yntema,
Basic Issues in Conflicts Law, 12 Am. J. Comp. L. 474, 482 (1963).
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II. SHOULD THE DRAFT NOT BE REVISED WITH A VIEW TO
ACHIEVING GREATER THEORETICAL CONSISTENCY?
Professor Cavers has summarized his criticism of the Contracts
chapter of the Draft by pointing out its "want of a consistent concep-
tion of the choice-of-law problem." 23 This criticism applies also to
the Draft as a whole insofar as it postulates (a) a "legislative juris-
diction" to be ascertained by (b) a "neutral forum" in potential dis-
regard of such concededly nonrestatable considerations as might lead
"interested states," by a weighing of (c) "massed" "contacts," with
the help of (d) various "structural" devices, to reach a law other than
that postulated by the Draft as "most appropriate."
A. "'Legislative Jurisdiction"
Under Professor Beale's vested rights theory, legislative juris-
diction denoted a "power" conferred on certain states "to create in-
terests which under the principles of the common law will be recog-
nized as valid in other states." 24 The Draft has discarded the vested
rights theory as well as the underlying fiction of a super-law. It has
recognized that any "decision to apply the law of a particular state is
in effect a holding that that state has jurisdiction," and that, in view
of the absence of constitutional control, 5 even a state with "lesser
contacts" may thus be attributed concurrent "jurisdiction" by any
forum.26 It appears, therefore, that the concept of legislative juris-
diction has, as the creation of each forum, now become a necessarily
misleading synonym for any "eligible law." 27
23 Cavers, supra note 10.
2RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §42 (1934). For fuller discussion, see
TREATISE §§ 12-13.25 The only case that RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS at 20 (Tent
Draft No. 3, 1956) properly cites as supporting such constitutional control is Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). The merely negative prohibition of that case
fails to establish an affirmative concept of legislative jurisdiction. See TREATISE § 9;
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL §§ 12, 13 (1965).
26 The Draft has expressly abandoned the Restatement's principal foundation in
an "analytical jurisprudence" at variance with the Institute's basic plan to proceed
"from precedent, from analogy, from legal reason, and from consideration of ethical
and social need." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (Tent. Draft no. 6,
1960).27 This tautology appears particularly in many passages of the earlier drafts.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS 21 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956)
("a state's law cannot validly be applied to create or affect legal interests unless that
state has legislative jurisdiction"); or id., at §42(1) ("a state may create or affect
legal interests whenever its contacts with a person, thing, or occurrence are sufficient
to make such action reasonable"). We learn that the tort law of state X will never
be applied in state Y to an accident in that state in a suit there (even where both
parties are forum citizens) because "X lacks legislative jurisdiction to apply its tort
law to this particular occurrence." Id. at 4. Does the denial of legislative jurisdiction
mean more here than that Y does not have a conflicts rule calling for the application
of X law? For similar tautologies, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 151(b), at 16 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962) ; and for effective criticism, 1956
ALl PROCEEDINGS 468 et seq.
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B. The "Neutral Forum" and "Interested States"
The Reporter informs us that the Draft was "written from the
viewpoint of a neutral forum which has no interest of its own to
protect and is seeking only to apply the most appropriate law." 28
Since this theory assumes an objectively ascertainable "most appropri-
ate law," it would in effect restore the fiction of vested rights and is
thus inconsistent with the Draft's own new, wholly relative, concept
of legislative jurisdiction.
To be sure, this inconsistency would by itself not be too disturbing
if it were limited to cases "in truly neutral forums." But since, as
the Reporter realizes, such cases "rarely arise," 29 the Second Restate-
ment does in effect, contrary to its avowed theoretical commitment,
purport to state the conflicts rules of non-neutral "interested" fora."
This is fatal to the Draft's very conception since, as the Reporter
properly concedes, some of the considerations prevailing in interested
fora "that will induce a court to apply its own local law rather than
that of another state ["the most appropriate law"] are many and
varied and are not susceptible to restatement." 31 The Reporter's con-
cession also implies an admission of defeat for that pervasive technique
of the Second Restatement which seeks to ascertain law "governing"
certain transactions by what Professor Cavers has stigmatized as a
"jurisdiction-selecting" approach.a
C. "Massed Contacts" and Forum Policies
The most recent installments of the Draft are replete with refer-
ences, interchangeably used, to "contacts," "connections," and "rela-
2SReese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 678, 692 (1963).
291d. at 692-93.
30 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379(3) (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1964) ; id. § 379a, at 21. This "interest" language, foreign to earlier drafts, has
apparently been borrowed from Currie's theory of "governmental interests." See
generally CuaIUE, SrEcTm EssAYS ON THE CoNFLI Ts OF LAws (1963). But it
should be noted that the Draft's usage does not accord with the originator's terminol-
ogy. See among many other instances, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 379a, comment e at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) : "The state where conduct occurs
has the greatest interest in regulating it and determining whether it is tortious in char-
acter." This indeed is the vested rights doctrine in a new disguise. Currie, supra
note 10, at 776. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS 94 (Tent
Draft No. 4, 1957) ("paramount interest"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 8, comment k (Tent Draft No. 12, 1965) ("dominant interest"). See gen-
erally id. § 6. Cf. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules",
49 CALn. L. REv. 240, 243-48 (1961) ; Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum:
A "Restatement" of the "Lex-fori Approach", to be published in Volume 18 of the
Oklahoma Law Review.
31 Reese, supra note 28, at 692. (Emphasis added.)
82 See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 10, at 350. For further compelling criticism, see
Currie, The Disinterested Forum, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 754, 765-66 (1963).
19651
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tionships" and their "massing." Concurrently we are referred to "the
relevant purposes of the . . . rules of the interested states," 38 which
apparently are identical with what prevailing opinion and occasionally
the Draft itself calls "policies." '4 This is not the place for defending
my own view that the only possibly relevant policy is that of the
forum,a" since reference to another state's policy presupposes a choice
of the law of that state, and since that choice in turn must be based
on the forum's policy (though that policy is of course frequently an
"altruistic" one). But it seems clear that the consideration of (forum
or foreign) policies is the very essence of choice of law and cannot
simply be contrasted with "contacts." If the "significance" of those
contacts were to be considered independently from policy, as the
Draft seems to suggest,"0 we would, indeed, have to complain with
Professor Currie that
surely we cannot go on indefinitely speaking of "significant
contacts" without asking and answering the question: Sig-
nificant for what? . . . It cannot be too often repeated that
the significance of the ways in which a state is related to the
parties, the events, the property, or the litigation cannot be
determined without reference to some standard-a standard
that the Restatement (Second) conspicuously neglects to
supply.
3 7
D. "Structure" of Choice of Law
Throughout the Draft we find references to such concepts and
techniques as characterization and renvoi ("whole law"). Elsewhere
I have analyzed these concepts and techniques as unwelcome importa-
tions from continental countries which have themselves either aban-
doned them or are in the process of doing so 3
33 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoN.Icr oF LAWS § 379(3) (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1964).
34 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLICT or LAWS § 332a(1) (c) (Tent.
Draft No. 6, as modified Nov. 15, 1960).
35 1 have last defended this view in EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL
§§8, 9 (1965).
36But see Wilcox v. Wilcox, 133 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Wis. 1965).
37 Currie, Full Faith and Credit Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress,
1964 SUPRF-E COURT REV. 89, 95. See text at notes 70-77, infra.
38 Ehrenzweig, Characterization in the Conflict of Laws: An Unwelcome Addi-
tion to American Doctrine, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW
395 (1961). But see RESTATEMENT (SECoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (Tent. Draft
No. 12, 1965). For its novel renvoi theory (id. § 8) the Reporter (id. at 34) claims
the support of "the more modern writers"-to the exclusion of Scoles' 1965 edition
of Goodrich, of Stumberg's 1963 edition, of Leflar's 1959 text and of the Treatise as
well as of the leading cases.
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III. SHOULD THE DRAFT NOT BE REVISED To RESPOND TO CURRENT
DOCTRINE?
The Institute had intended to avail itself of "the labors of the
foremost scholars." " This attempt was abandoned in the field of
conflicts law for both restatements. Not only did most leading scholars
refrain from participating in the First Restatement-names like Cavers,
Cook, Leflar, Lorenzen, Stumberg, and Yntema immediately come to
mind-, but many of them actively opposed its adoption.40 Ernst
Rabel, from whose support the Institute had expected so much, in due
course found the Restatement the "exact antipode of private inter-
national law [and] entirely destroyed by Lorenzen and Cook." " And
there still rings in our ears Hessel Yntema's indictment of the Restate-
ment for its deviation from existing law by
(1) nonstatement of relevant, substantiated doctrine, (2)
nonstatement of relevant legislative trends, (3) statement
of nonsubstantiated doctrine, (4) statement as existing law
of doctrine repealed in the majority of American jurisdic-
tions, (5) inaccurate statement of existing precedents, (6)
acceptance of inappropriate and questionable English prece-
dents as authority.'
In the list of advisers to the Reporter of the Second Restatement
we miss again such names as Cavers, Currie, Hancock, Leflar,
Rheinstein, Stumberg, Von Mehren, and Yntema, in addition to
almost the entire generation of younger scholars. Such argumenta
ad hominem are painful, but they cannot be avoided at this critical
stage.
Perhaps even more significant than the Draft's failure to respond
to current doctrine, is the fact that the Institute's Council itself appears
to have failed to achieve even substantial agreement concerning the
very basis of those parts of the Draft which most prominently reflect
its new approach. Reportedly, the Council approved the "most sig-
nificant relationship" test of contracts law, which has since become the
basis of the torts chapter as well, by a mere majority of thirteen to
twelve !43
89 2 ALI PROCFmINGs 21 (1924).
40 See, e.g., Yntema, The Restatement of the Lazo of Conflict of Laws, 36 COLUM.
L. REv. 183 (1936); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv.
L. Rxv. 173, 178-79, 208 (1933), in addition to what may be considered the life work
of Cook and Lorenzen.
411 RABEL, CoNmucT oF LAWs 14 (2d ed. 1958).
42 Yntema, supra note 40, at 222.
4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), Co~micr oF LAws 30 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
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IV. SHOULD THE DRAFT NOT BE LIMITED TO THOSE NARROW
PROPOSITIONS WHICH ARE SETTLED IN LIGHT OF JUDICIAL
PRACTICE (RATHER THAN MERE LANGUAGE)?
There are of course many propositions in the Draft which accu-
rately reflect judicial practice. This is true for much of Tentative
Drafts Numbers Five and Thirteen (Property). But many other pro-
visions of the Draft lack supporting authority. Most of the cases
relied on are inconclusive because they fail to involve conflicting laws
or do not actually apply the "rule" invoked, and are thus cited merely
for their language rather than their result.' This technique is par-
ticularly hazardous in conflicts law where judicial language is pri-
marily based on a doctrinal terminology whose meaning has changed
repeatedly through a period of more than half a millennium, and
which, insofar as it involves cases of the last few decades, often invokes
Restatement formulas now discarded. I have tried to prove these
assertions by an analysis of almost ten thousand cases." All I can do
at this point is (a) to analyze a few typical examples of the Draft's
use of authority, (b) to characterize in light of these examples some
of the Draft's individual installments, and (c) to take issue with the
argument that those provisions of the Draft which lack authoritative
support state desirable law and are thus likely to furnish welcome guid-
ance to the courts.
A. Examples for the Draft's Use of Authority
(1) Section 379k would ordinarily subject malicious prosecution
and abuse of process to the "local law of the state where the proceed-
ings complained of occurred." But none of the cases relied on
justifies the proposal: Vancouver Book & Stationery Co. v. L. C.
Smith & Corona Typewriters 46 fails to state a conflict (general ap-
proach "in conformity with the general thought"); in Siebrand v.
Eyerly Aircraft Co.,47 the decision was in accord with the "federal
44 See, e.g., notes 46-51, infra; or RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLIcT OF LAws
§ 354k (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960) where we are told that "the law governing the
relationship determines the existence and extent of any quasi-contractual obligation,"
and that this rule "is supported by the reasoning and result" of three cases and "by
the result reached" in the great majority of other decided cases. I have tried to
show that none of the authorities adduced for these propositions supports the con-
clusions reached. TREATISE § 227, at 601 n.30. See also id. § 175, at 466 n.11 for
Pennsylvania.
45Id., passim. See also Cavers, supra note 10, criticizing the "erratic pattern
. . . lacking in internal coherence" in the Draft's use of authority.
41138 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). See also
Jones v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 454 (D.N.D. 1965) (what is "prob-
able cause"?).
47 185 F. Supp. 538 (D. Ore. 1960).-
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law" and the rule "generally applied"; in International Film Distrib.
Establishment v. Paramount Pictures Corp.48 we can at best find a
dictum used to invite a motion to dismiss that apparently was never
made; and in Pelella v. Pelella,49 the pertinent forum rule was ex-
pressly said to "conform" with the pertinent foreign law. The only
case among those cited in which a potential difference between the
potentially applicable laws was mentioned was that of Weiss v.
Hunna,° which in effect applied the lex fori8 1 And why, indeed,
should the perpetrator of a malicious prosecution be encouraged to
choose a state for his action whose law will protect him against the
consequences of his malice?
(2) Section 132 declares that "a marriage is invalid everywhere,
even though the requirements of the state where the marriage took
place have been complied with, if it is invalid under the law of a state
where at least one of the parties is domiciled at the time of the marriage
and where both intend to make their home thereafter." 52 According
to this rule a marriage validly concluded in Illinois between two
Mississippi domiciliaries of different "races" would be invalid in
California (which it is not),0 if at the time of the marriage they had
intended to return to Mississippi, although they later decided to make
their home in California.54 In the absence of judicial authority for
this startling result we are hard put to explain the Institute's action
whose sole support is sought in a novel concept of a "state of para-
mount interest," and which is so obviously contrary to the mood
and spirit of our time.
(3) The Second Restatement undertakes no more and no less
than to undermine one of the very few positions of certainty and co-
48 14 Misc. 2d 203, 155 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct 1956), aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d
746, 216 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1961), reargument and appeal denied, 14 App. Div. 2d 531,
218 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1961).
49 13 Misc. 2d 260, 176 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 9 App. Div. 2d 897,
195 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).
50 312 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 853 (1963), in partial reliance
on TREATISE § 215, at 558, 563. In Jones v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 237 F. Supp.
454 (D.N.D. 1965), the court concededly applied its own conception of "the gist of
the wrong" as permitting the defense of probable cause.
51 That law is probably in effect applied to all intentional torts. See Willen-
bucher v. McCormick, 229 F. Supp. 659, 661-62 (D. Colo. 1964) (defamation), in
partial reliance on TREATISE § 215, at 558.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 132, at 116 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1957).
53 See Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). See generally
TREATISE § 139, at 382, 387.
54 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 132, comment b, at 118 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1957) ; see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 132, comment d, Illustra-
tion 13 (1934); Ehrenzweig Miscegenation of the Conflict of Laws, 45 CoRNu= L.Q.
659 (1960).
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herence that the Supreme Court has been able and willing to establish
in the area of interstate conflicts law. Ever since Justice Holmes'
opinion in Fauntleroy v. Lure,"5 it has been clear that the forum's
public policy cannot be allowed to defeat enforceability of a sister
state judgment. And ever since courts have adhered to this hardwon
principle of a matured federalism. Yet, the American Law Institute,
following the Reporter's highly controversial theory,"6 is now prepared
to scuttle this achievement in more than tenuous reliance on five judi-
cial opinions none of which represents a majority holding and four
of which were rendered in such areas as support,5 7 custody,"8 and
workmen's compensation5" suits where the forum may well claim an
overriding interest as the parens patriae; " while the last opinion left
open as a possible, but now increasingly unlikely, 1 exception to full
faith and credit tax assessments, an historical enclave of alleged govern-
mental concern.' There is thus no authority whatsoever for the
startling proposition that "a judgment rendered in one State of the
United States need not be recognized or enforced in a sister State
if such recognition or enforcement . . . would involve an improper
infringement of the interests of the sister State." 3
B. The Several Installments of the Draft
(1) Tentative Drafts Numbers One, Three, Four, Four (a) and
Ten, which deal with Jurisdiction and Judgments, attempt to restate
concepts and rules which, insofar as they are determined by the Con-
stitution, are hardly a proper subject of restatements of the common
law, and which, insofar as they are not so determined, are apt to
mislead since they necessarily ignore the widely differing statutes of
the several states. The history under the regime of the First Restate-
5 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
56 Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLum.
L. REv. 153 (1949), now incorporated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICr OF LAWs
58, 59 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
57 Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting).
See TREATISE § 5, at 14, § 51, at 183, § 56, at 205.
58 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619 (1947) (Rutledge, J., con-
curring) ; see TREATISE § 87, at 291-92. See also Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child
to be published by the Michigan Law Review.
59 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (Stone, C.J.) (dictum);
see TREATISE § 63, at 220-21.
60 See id. § 56, at 205.
11 See id. at 174-75.
62 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (Stone, C.J.)
(dictum).
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 434c at 56-59 (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1964).
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ment, of the provisions on divorce, 4 nullity, 5 and custody6 should
have been taken as a warning. 7
(2) Tentative Draft Number Two retains the First Restatement's
concept of a unitary domicile in the black-letter text of section 11 ("no
person has more than one domicile at the time"), but in effect negates
that concept in the comments which concede the possibility that one may
have different domiciles "under the laws of different states" and even
"under the law of a single state" for different purposes.""
(3) Tentative Draft Number Four is based on a concept of a
person's status independent from its incidents. It is maintained that
"this status remains the same during his travels from state to state
[although] the incidents arising under the status are likely to vary
since they will often depend upon the law of the state where they are
sought to be enjoyed." 9 The inconsistency in this statement is not
removed by the subsequent sections.
(4) Tentative Draft Number Six on Contracts is of course almost
entirely based on the repetition of the give-it-up formula of the "most
significant relationship" and has therefore been severely criticized.7" It
is admittedly the "proper law" theory of the Commonwealth countries
and the "center of gravity" language of the New York Court of
Appeals. The less than fortunate experience of that court alone 71
should have prevented adoption of this approach which holds a serious
danger. The Second Restatement formula can be used to support
virtually any result and is thus bound to hamper the sound development
of the common law by saving the court the difficult but necessary effort
of articulating those true motivations which are of course the very
elements of growing rules.
Those few provisions of the Draft which attempt more tangible
solutions, are largely unsupported by authority. This applies to such
64 See TaR TIsE §§ 71-78.
65 See id. §§ 91-92.
06 See id. §§ 86-89.
67 See text at notes 24-27, supra regarding legislative jurisdiction; text at notes
55-63, supra concerning full faith and credit to judgments.
6S RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNmIcT OF LAWS § 11, comments c & d (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1954).
69R ESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 119, comment a at 87 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1957) ; see TREATISE § 135.
70 See, e.g., Cavers, Re-Stating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts,
in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 349, 364 (1961); Weintraub,
The Contracts Proposal of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique,
46 IowA L. REv. 713 (1961).
71 See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2 441 (1961);
cf. Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard" in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29
U. Cxi. L. REv. 498 (1962).
1965]
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important propositions as those which postulate applicability of the
validating law in the one situation in which it does not and should not
apply, namely in the conflicts law governing the defense of usury;7
or of the law of the surrender of the chattel to breaches of warranty; 73
or the law of the state of departure to contracts of transportation. 74
(5) Tentative Drafts Numbers Eight and Nine recommend adop-
tion of the "most significant relationship" formula for what the
Institute, in accord with the First Restatement, somewhat quaintly
continues to designate as "Wrongs." These Drafts will thus not only
share the problems of the Contracts chapter, but, in addition, lack even
such tenuous support as that underlying that chapter. The Institute's
recommendation will, therefore, have to be defended on the ground
that, though concededly not restating existing law, it proposes de-
sirable rules which in due course will be adopted by the courts. It is
submitted that this defense, which in any event cannot properly support
a purported "restatement," is hardly justified in light of the Institute's
experience with its First Restatement.
C. Desirable Law?
The Restatement in the Courts (1945, 1948, 1954) lists hundreds
of cases which have cited the First Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.
These listings are misleading and should be discontinued or at least
explained. For only very few of them reflect adoption of the Institute's
teaching. In the vast majority of the cases cited, there was no conflict
or the court avoided the effect of the Restatement "rule" by such
artificial devices as re-characterization, re-localization, renvoi or in-
vocation of public policy. At least in conflicts law, it can hardly be
said therefore, that "the story of what has been accomplished by the
Restatement of the Law can best be told by statistics." 7r
Owing to the vagueness of the Second Restatement's give-it-up
formulas, any proof of that document's accomplishments based on a
mechanical listing of the cases citing it, will be even less valid than
has been the application of this method to vindicate the First Restate-
ment. To be sure, justification of tort conflicts decisions as based on
the Second Restatement's law of "the most significant relationship"
"2 See TREATISE § 182.
7 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 346g, comment b (Tent Draft
No. 6, 1960).
74 Id. § 346n.
75 Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q.
283, 291.
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will be harmless enough where the result thus reached accords with
that postulated by current doctrine. Indeed, our brief experience so
far has shown that the courts are inclined to use such a justification as
an ever-fitting make-weight argument."' But this is not always so.
Thus, when a distinguished court recently relied on the Draft's facile
formula in a case involving an insurer's liability for failure to act
promptly, it may well thus have been precluded from reaching another
result by failing to articulate the conflicting interests and policies.7"
In those few instances in which the chapter on Wrongs undertakes
to offer a more specific solution than its general formula, that solution
is open to serious doubt. In the light of available authority it is quite
doubtful whether, and if so when, a court will apply a law other than
its own in fraud cases; 7 whether the First Restatement's 7 "authori-
zation" test of vicarious liability can still be maintained even in a
modified form; " and whether in wrongful death cases the place of
injury can still be given primary relevance."' On the other hand, it
seems hardly justifiable to make the give-it-up formula of "the most
significant relationship" applicable to such problems as imputed negli-
gence,82 survival of actions,' charitable immunity,84 or contribution
between tortfeasors, s5 where consistent court practice would permit
more definite conclusions.
Judge Goodrich has stressed that "in conflict of laws the growth
is faster than in some other places." 8' And Pennsylvania Supreme
76 See, e.g., Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 61 nn.*,
198 N.E.2d 681, 690 nn.8, 9 (1964), though relying substantially (id. at 60, 198 N.E.2d
at 689) on the calculability theory, TREATISE § 223, at 591. But see Wilcox v. Wilcox,
133 N.W.2d 408, 417 (Wis. 1965), expressing cautious reserve regarding the Second
Restatement's list of "contacts" and relying with at least equal approval on three other
theories including that of the author. Id. at 413.
7 7 Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fiduciary Mut. Life Ins. Co., 319
F.2d 469, 473 n.7 (1963) ; cf. Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in
Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 700, 702-05 (1963).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379c (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964);
cf. TREATISE § 215, at 558-59.
79 RESTATEMENT, CorNFLIcr OF LAWS § 387 (1934).
so RESTATEMSENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390f (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964);
cf. TREATISE §§ 170, 219.
8 1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS 2391 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964);
cf. TREATISE § 213, at 552-56.
s2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 385b (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964);
cf. TREATISE § 246, at 652-53.
s3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNF_.Icr OF LAWS § 390 (Tent Draft No. 9, 1964) ;
cf. TREATISE § 103, at 313.
84 RESTATEMENT (SECoND), CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 390a (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) ;
cf. TREATISE § 221, at 583-84.
s RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390d (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) ;
cf. TREATISE § 225, at 595-96.
86 Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of Laws,
50 COLUm. L. REv. 881, 899 (1950).
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Court Justice Roberts, refuting the First Restatement, has recently
welcomed a new stage of this growth:
We are at the beginning of the development of a workable
fair and flexible approach to choice of law which will become
more certain as it is tested and further refined when applied
to specific cases before our courts.5
Surely, it is neither feasible nor desirable to "restate" a beginning.
87 Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
